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Abstract 
People are particularly attracted to groups that value morality. However, in social and 
work life, team decision-making sometimes involves balancing moral considerations with 
achievement goals in ambiguous situations. We examined how the importance attached to 
morality and competence in experimentally created task teams influenced perceived team 
attractiveness and motivational responses. Results showed that team attractiveness was fully 
determined by value attached to morality in a team. However, cardiovascular responses 
revealed that when actually engaging in a team interaction where unanimous decisions had to 
be made about competing considerations, value attached to both morality and competence in a 
team influenced participants’ motivational states. Congruence between the value attached to 
morality and competence elicited adaptive challenge responses, while incongruence between 
these team features elicited maladaptive threat. These results have important theoretical and 
practical implications. 
 
Keywords: morality; competence; impression-formation; cardiovascular responses; 
group decision-making. 
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What seems attractive may not always work well: Evaluative and cardiovascular responses to 
morality and competence levels in decision-making teams 
People are generally attracted to moral groups, task teams and organizations 
(Ellemers, Kingma, Van de Burgt, & Barreto, 2011; Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007; Van 
Prooijen & Ellemers, 2015). Yet, although many people are committed to acting in 
accordance with moral values, they sometimes encounter situations where a trade-off needs to 
be made between a group decision that can be considered as morally ‘good’, and a competent 
decision that ensures the effectiveness of the group in terms of task performance or financial 
success. For example, groups can be confronted in social or work life with decisions where 
group values collide with economic necessities due to scarcity of group resources (Tetlock, 
2003).  
Groups may differ in how they tend to respond to such ambiguous situations. That is, 
some groups are characterized by an emphasis on moral values, in which integrity and 
honesty are the primary concerns in decision-making. In other contexts, groups might be fully 
focused on task performance or financial achievement, thereby accepting the possibility that 
moral considerations have to be adjusted to make this possible. We address these differences 
in the current research, by examining how the value attached to morality and competence in 
experimental decision-making teams impacts on perceived team attractiveness and on 
individual motivational states (indicated by cardiovascular markers) during task completion, 
in contexts where morality and competence considerations have to be balanced.  
Morality as primary determinant of team attractiveness 
According to social identity theory, people can derive social meaning and value from 
their membership in groups, teams, and organizations (Tajfel, 1978; see also Ellemers & 
Haslam, 2011; Haslam & Ellemers, 2011). The connection between group features and 
personal self-views promotes the attraction to groups with positive characteristics as well as 
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the tendency of individual group members to positively evaluate characteristic group features 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The competence-related achievements and successes of groups have 
tended to be considered as the main source of group status and value, in particular in 
performance contexts relating to education or work (Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton, & Hume, 
2001). Yet, recent research has revealed that group morality may be just as relevant or an 
even more important source of group value, even in contexts where performance and 
achievement are clearly required  (Brambilla, Sacchi, Pagliaro, & Ellemers, 2013; Ellemers, 
Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008). In fact, compared to competence as well as sociability, 
group morality has been found to have a stronger impact on the overall evaluation of the 
group, on group identification and on group pride in prior research with different types of 
samples, manipulations and measures (Leach et al., 2007). Individuals tend to rely on 
morality-related information to form an impression of whether other people’s intentions 
toward them are beneficial or harmful, whereas competence-related information indicates 
whether people are capable of successfully pursuing their intentions (Brambilla, Sacchi, 
Rusconi, Cherubini, & Yzerbyt, 2012; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007). Thus, both competence 
and morality concerns should play a role, even in work contexts—where competence (e.g., 
task performance, economic achievement) is expected to be key. Nevertheless, prior research 
revealed that—when facing a trade-off between morality and competence in work contexts—
people prefer to be included in an organization or a work team that values morality over 
competence rather than vice versa (Van Prooijen & Ellemers, 2015).   
Although several studies have demonstrated the primacy of morality features as a 
determinant of the attractiveness of groups, little research has focused on the impact of such 
features on the further responses of individual group members once they are included in such 
groups. The aims of the current research are twofold. First, we aim to replicate prior work 
demonstrating the impact of moral group features on perceived team attractiveness, under 
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more controlled (experimental) conditions. Second, we aim to extend previous research by 
examining how morality and competence group features affect individual group members’ 
motivational states that may operate when collaborating on team tasks. Cardiovascular 
reactivity will be measured to assess the adaptiveness of the motivational states that are 
elicited by group morality and competence features.  
Motivational threat versus challenge 
The biopsychosocial (BPS) model of arousal regulation (Blascovich & Mendes, 2000; 
Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996) posits that engagement in a motivated performance situation 
(e.g., task performance, playing a game, social interactions) can elicit a motivational state of 
challenge or threat, which are indicated by distinct patterns of cardiovascular responses. The 
relation between perceived individual resources (e.g., skills, dispositions, support) and the 
estimated demands (e.g., required effort, uncertainty, danger) relevant to the performance 
situation determines the response that is elicited. An adaptive state of challenge emerges when 
individuals evaluate the resources available to them as meeting or exceeding the demands of 
the situation. A maladaptive state of threat results when individuals feel unprepared to cope 
with a situation and evaluate demands of the situation as exceeding the resources available to 
them.  
Physiological challenge and threat responses can be distinguished by comparing 
cardiac output (CO) –the amount of blood pumped from the heart per minute—and vascular 
resistance (i.e., total peripheral resistance; TPR) to a baseline assessment. Challenge is 
indicated by a dilation of arteries (lower TPR) to accommodate an increase in blood 
circulation (higher CO), and therefore represents a more efficient mobilization of energy than 
threat, which is indicated by a constriction of arteries (higher TPR) and no change or a 
decrease in blood circulation (lower CO—see Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996, for an overview). 
However, rather than representing two dichotomous states, challenge and threat should be 
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considered as opposite ends of one bipolar continuum. Consequently, relative differences in 
motivational states (e.g., greater or lesser challenge or threat) are of significance and are more 
commonly examined than the absolute occurrence of a single motivational state  (Seery, 
2011).  
Examining on-line emergence of cardiovascular responses provides several advantages 
over more traditional retrospective self-report measures (Frings, Hurst, Cleveland, 
Blascovich, & Abrams, 2012; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Weisbuch, Seery, Ambady, & 
Blascovich, 2009). For example, cardiovascular responses can be assessed during team 
interactions—thereby avoiding the possibly biased evaluation of situations in anticipation or 
in hindsight. Importantly, cardiovascular responses cannot easily be controlled by participants 
for self-presentational purposes. Furthermore, in addition to cognitive deliberations, 
nonconscious and implicit affective processes influence the evaluation of demands and 
resources within a situation—and therefore whether challenge or threat states are elicited. 
Whereas relative challenge has been associated with a range of positive outcomes, relative 
threat has been shown to negatively affect task performance (Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter, & 
Salomon, 1999; Blascovich, Seery, Mugridge, Norris, & Weisbuch, 2004), openness to 
opposing viewpoints during team decision-making (De Wit, Scheepers, & Jehn, 2012), and 
long-term physical health (Blascovich, 2008). 
Motivational responses to morality and competence 
Our aim is to relate individual level threat-challenge responses to team features that 
inform the individual of the resources available in the situation to meet current task demands. 
This allows us to unveil how the value attached to morality and competence by other team 
members impacts individual motivational states in contexts where team consensus needs to be 
obtained under competing task demands. We examine the possibility that the impact of team 
morality and competence on ratings of a priori team attractiveness might differ from their 
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impact on the motivational state (indicated by cardiovascular responses) that is elicited once 
individuals actually engage in a team decision-making task. When people form an a priori 
impression of the team, they try to anticipate whether their inclusion in this team is likely to 
be a source of pride and positive identity. In this context, where they focus on how team 
features might contribute to group-relevant self-views, the morality of the team is more likely 
to stand out as an important source of value to individual group members than is the 
competence of the team.  
The relative importance of morality in comparison to competence has consistently 
been revealed in various contexts—such as in natural group settings (Leach et al., 2007), 
experimental task teams (Ellemers, Pagliaro, & Barreto, 2013), and organizational contexts 
(Van Prooijen & Ellemers, 2015). For example, previous research has shown that intentions to 
interact with national in-group and out-group members were driven by their morality levels, 
but not their competence levels (Brambilla et al., 2013). Likewise, only perceived in-group 
morality has been shown to affect people’s pride in their in-group or their preference to 
distance themselves from it (Leach et al., 2007). We therefore hypothesize that attraction to 
the team should be driven primarily by the value other team members attach to morality rather 
than competence.  
However, when engaging with other team members during a joint decision-making 
task, situational demands—for instance in the form of concrete task requirements that have to 
be met—are likely to become more prominent. The situational demands of a joint decision-
making task tend to depend on the nature of the specific task. Certain tasks might require 
teams to focus only on competence concerns or only on morality concerns, whereas a balance 
between these concerns might be preferable in more ambiguous decision-making tasks. In the 
current research we argue that a discrepancy between the task requirements regarding 
morality and competence concerns on the one hand and the value attached to these features by 
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team members on the other will increase individual assessments of the situational demands, 
while it will reduce individual assessments of the available situational resources. A 
discrepancy between task demands and values of team members is therefore likely to promote 
a threat response. 
 In an ambiguous decision-making task, individuals are best equipped to meet the 
situational demands of a task requesting them to reconcile moral values with competence 
requirements when there is a balance in the importance their teammates attach to these 
different concerns. When other team members attach equal value to morality and competence, 
this represents a relevant resource to individuals who are expected to reconcile both types of 
concerns in meeting the demands of the joint task. In comparison, when other team members 
clearly value morality over competence or vice versa, they will be reluctant to take into 
account the concern that is deemed less important by them in their joint decision making 
(Ditto and Lopez, 1992). This is likely to add to the task demands as experienced by 
individuals, as they realize they will somehow have to overrule or compensate for this lack of 
balance in their teammates’ concerns to reach an optimal task performance. Thus, we predict 
that teams in which equal value is attached to morality and competence elicit a more adaptive 
challenge state in individual team members. In this case the team offers them more resources 
to meet situational task demands, as they are more likely to support the efforts that try to 
incorporate both types of concerns in their joint decision. For similar reasons, we predict that 
individual team members will experience a more maladaptive state of threat in teams in which 
concerns are less balanced. When other team members clearly prioritize morality over 
competence or vice versa, this complicates team decision-making. It adds to the situational 
demands under which individuals have to meet the task requirement to balance competence 
concerns with moral concerns in joint decision-making, as more individual effort is likely to 
be required while the achievement of desired outcomes is more uncertain. Thus, even though 
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we examine individual level threat vs. challenge responses, we argue that individual 
assessments of the situational resources and demands relevant to successful task completion 
are informed by their awareness that other team members are equally willing to consider both 
these concerns, or will tend to prioritize one over the other.  
Method 
Participants 
Seventy-six students (55 females, 21 males) at Leiden University completed the 
experiment in return for course credit or €8.00. The age of the participants ranged from 17 
years to 50 years (M = 20.96, SD = 4.22).  
Design and procedure 
The hypotheses were tested in a 2 (value attached to morality in the team: high vs. 
low) by 2 (value attached to competence in the team: high vs. low) between-subjects design. 
At the beginning of the experiment participants were attached to physiological sensors to 
measure cardiac and hemodynamic activity, which was followed by a five-minute baseline 
period. The procedure developed by Van Prooijen and Ellemers (2015; Study 3) was 
followed, where an experimental team task was constructed to examine the impact of team 
morality and team competence on individual attractiveness ratings. Participants were 
informed that they—together with two other participants—would complete a task that focused 
on dilemmas between morality and competence in business contexts. We selected a business 
context as a suitable setting for the experimental decision-making task, as it has been 
observed that many businesses are characterized by a complex trade-off between financial and 
nonfinancial business objectives, in which both morality and competence represent relevant 
concerns (Clegg, Kornberger, & Rhodes, 2007; Hahn, Figge, Pinkse, & Preuss, 2010; 
Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Vogel, 2005). 
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 In preparation for the task and as part of the team introduction, participants were 
asked to complete a brief questionnaire indicating the importance of morality (i.e., their own 
perceived sincerity, honesty, and trustworthiness) and competence in their own self-views 
(i.e., their perceived capability, intelligence, and skillfulness; see the Materials section for 
more details). Their average morality and competence scores would ostensibly be displayed to 
the other team members and vice versa. The alleged average scores indicating the importance 
other team members attached to morality and competence were then presented, which in 
addition were said to be either relatively high or low depending on experimental condition. 
Next, participants were informed that—in order to get further acquainted with the team—each 
team member would be asked to record two videos in which they could inform the other team 
members of their general morality and competence concerns. They were instructed to use this 
opportunity to indicate the importance they attached to each of these concerns across a range 
of situations, and to provide a concrete example of such a situation to illustrate their general 
inclination to display moral and competent behavior. Participants were first presented with 
four webcam videos displaying behavioral descriptions allegedly provided by their team 
members. In reality, these were pre-recorded videos prepared by confederates. To support the 
belief that two other team members were present during the experimental session, participants 
were asked to wait a moment before the first video was presented, as the other team members 
needed some time to record their videos. We always presented participants with videos of 
same-gender confederates to control for gender effects; the text of the confederate videos was 
identical, regardless of gender. Value attached to Morality in the team (high vs. low) was 
manipulated in the first video of each confederate. Both confederates started with a statement 
that they considered themselves as (quite/ not very) moral. One confederate further elaborated 
on this by explaining (regularly/never) giving money to charity, and generally (not) being 
willing to help others, and then gave a concrete example of (not) providing help when this 
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was explicitly requested by a friend. The other confederate revealed that honesty was 
generally (not) important to him/her, and recounted a particular experience of (not) having 
been honest about receiving too much change in a store to illustrate this. The two remaining 
videos also contained behavioral descriptions of the two confederates, this time these were 
meant to illustrate the value they allegedly attached to Competence (high vs. low). Again, 
both confederates first stated how important competence (quite/ not very) was to them in their 
overall self-views.  One confederate then proceeded to describe the relative ease of success 
(or their relative difficulty to succeed) in their performance at university and at work in 
comparison to others, to illustrate this. The other confederate first stated that performance was 
generally (not) important to them, which was followed by a description of winning (or losing) 
an important sports match, and their aversion against (or indifference toward) losing in 
general, to illustrate this general tendency. Participants were then instructed to record their 
own video with the webcam, describing their own moral and competent behavior indicating to 
their team members the value they attached to these domains. They were asked to speak for a 
minimum of 30 seconds in two separate recordings, during which their cardiovascular 
responses were measured. Manipulation checks and measures of team attractiveness and 
identification were introduced afterwards.  
Subsequently, the team decision-making task was presented, in which participants 
were required to choose between two business strategies in various dilemma situations 
(further details below). Participants were told that they first had to indicate their personal 
preferences for each situation, before discussing these with their team members to reach a 
unanimous group decision on which business strategy to follow in each case. After 
participants had indicated their personal preferences for each task item, team commitment was 
assessed.1 Responses to all self-report measures were provided on Likert scales ranging from 
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Descriptive statistics of the self-report measures 
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are presented in Table 1.2 Participants were then asked to use the webcam to describe to their 
team mates which strategies they had used to determine their personal preferences in the 
decision-making task—allegedly in preparation of a more extensive group discussion—during 
which their physiological responses were measured. To support the cover story that they were 
engaged in an interaction with other team members, participants could see themselves as well 
as the (prerecorded) faces of the confederates—who were allegedly listening to what they 
said—during the webcam recording. After completing the webcam recording, participants 
were informed that the experiment was finished and no further group discussion would take 
place. We explicitly asked participants to not discuss the true purpose of the experiment with 
others, and we explained how this disclosure could negatively affect our research. 
Materials 
Self-perceived importance of morality and competence. The perceived importance 
of morality and competence for participants’ self-views was assessed using the 3 morality 
traits (e.g., “I consider myself to be sincere”; α = .78) and the 3 competence traits (e.g., “I 
consider myself to be skilled”; α = .77) identified as central descriptors of these dimensions 
by Leach et al. (2007). 
Manipulation checks. These same traits indicating self-perceived importance of 
morality and competence were used to check the experimental manipulations. Perceptions of 
each team member’s importance attached to morality were checked with three items (e.g., 
“Team member A appears to be honest”, α = .91). Similarly, three items were used to check 
perceptions of the importance each team member attached to their competence (e.g., “Team 
member A appears to be intelligent”, α = .84). An average score of the ratings of team 
member A and of team member B was calculated to assess the correlation between their 
morality ratings, r(74) = .56, p < .001, and their competence ratings, r(74) = .49, p < .001. 
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Team attractiveness. Five items were used to assess perceived team attractiveness 
(Van Prooijen & Ellemers, 2015; e.g., “I respect this team”, α = .88). 
Identification. Identification with the team was measured with four items (Ellemers, 
Spears, & Doosje, 1999; e.g., “I identify with this team”, α = .91). 
Team decision-making task. The team decision-making task was presented as a 
‘business management task’, which portrayed ten business problems where participants had to 
make a trade-off between a moral solution that could jeopardize financial returns of the 
business and a competent solution that might compromise ethical considerations, thereby 
creating a binary choice for participants for each item. The solutions they had to choose from 
represented competing demands that were both justifiable. Some brief arguments for each 
solution were provided to clarify this. For example, one problem portrayed a new regional 
company—which specifically aimed to help women and minorities with limited qualifications 
on the job market—that was struggling to survive. The scenario described how this company 
inquired whether the organization that participants imagined working for would be willing to 
invest in this company. In the competent solution, the investment is not made—even though 
the initiative is considered important—as the financial costs are unlikely to be compensated. 
In the moral solution, the high-risk investment is made for ideological reasons, despite the 
fact that it involves substantial costs for the organization. The items used in this way 
represented a range of situations and decision types (regarding business investments, external 
communications, HR policies, customer services) pitting competence against morality 
concerns in each case. The extremity of the solutions provided (e.g., the competitive 
aggressiveness of the competent solutions, the ethical vigilance of the moral solutions) was 
varied across different decisions. We took care to make sure that none of the offered solutions 
were explicitly immoral or incompetent in order to construct a realistic dilemma situation in 
which different priorities had to be weighed against each other.  
TEAM MORALITY AND COMPETENCE                                                                            14 
Team commitment. Team commitment was assessed with three items (Bishop & 
Scott, 2000; e.g., “I would be proud to tell others that I belong to this team”, α = .80).   
Cardiovascular measures. Impedance cardiographic (ICG) and electrocardiographic 
(ECG) signals were continuously recorded using a Biopac MP150 system (Biopac Systems, 
Goleta, CA). Blood pressure was continually measured using a Vasotrac APM205A device 
(Medwave, Arden Hills, MN). Acqknowledge 3.8.2 software (Biopac, Goleta, CA) was used 
to store the physiological data and to calculate mean arterial pressure (MAP) from the raw 
blood pressure readings. MAP is one of the components of TPR. The impedance cardiograms 
were scored (blind to condition) with VU-AMS software (AMS-IMP, version 1.3.8.4, Free 
University, Amsterdam), which yielded CO. TPR was calculated from CO and MAP using the 
following formula: TPR=80*(MAP/CO). In addition to CO and TPR, we also calculated a 
combined threat - challenge index (TCI) by subtracting the standardized z-score of TPR from 
the standardized z-score of CO (Blascovich et al., 2004). Higher scores on the resulting 
index— which optimizes the reliability of the cardiovascular assessments (Seery, Weisbuch, 
Hetenyi, & Blascovich, 2010)—indicate greater challenge (and lesser threat). In addition to 
CO, TPR, and TCI, heart rate (HR, derived from the ECG) and pre-ejection period (PEP, 
derived from the ECG and ICG) were assessed to examine task engagement, which is a 
requirement to identify the experimental setting as a motivated performance situation. Task 
engagement is reflected in increases in HR and decreases in the PEP, compared to baseline 
levels.  
Results 
Self-perceived importance of morality and competence. One-sample t-tests showed 
that the importance participants attached to morality (M = 5.57, SD = 0.76), t(75) = 17.99, p < 
.001, and to competence (M = 4.92, SD = 0.72), t(75) = 11.16, p < .001, in their self-views 
were higher than the scale mid-point. Self-perceived importance of morality was somewhat 
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higher than self-perceived importance of competence, t(75) = 6.87, p < .001. These findings 
suggest that both competence and morality dimensions are considered as valued features of 
one’s identity, as anticipated.   
Manipulation checks. The analysis of the team morality manipulation check revealed 
a main effect of morality, F(1, 72) = 22.70, p < .001, partial η2 = .24. Participants in the high 
morality condition perceived their team members to be more concerned with morality (M = 
5.36, SD = 0.68) than did participants in the low morality condition (M = 4.16, SD = 1.28). 
All other effects were non-significant, F < 1.27, p > .26. As intended, we obtained a 
significant main effect of competence on the team competence manipulation check, F(1, 72) = 
28.50, p < .001, partial η2 = .28. Overall, team members were perceived to attach more value 
to their competence in the high competence condition (M = 5.09, SD = 0.59) than in the low 
competence condition (M = 4.36, SD = 0.75). In addition, the analysis yielded a main effect of 
morality on the competence manipulation check, F(1, 72) = 5.71, p = .02, partial η2 = .07. The 
perceived importance the team members attached to competence was higher in the high 
morality condition (M = 4.82, SD = 0.59) than in the low morality condition (M = 4.63, SD = 
0.91). No significant interaction was observed, F = 2.50, p = .12. The difference between the 
effect sizes of the main effects was tested using the procedure described by Rosnow and 
Rosenthal (2002). Results indicated that the effect size of the additional main effect of 
morality is smaller than the intended main effect of competence, Z = 2.07, p = .02. Similar 
‘spill-over’ effects of information about team morality on perceived team competence have 
been observed in previous research (Van Prooijen & Ellemers, 2015).   
Self-report measures  
A MANOVA on the team attractiveness, identification, and team commitment scales 
yielded a multivariate main effect of morality, F(3, 70) = 11.81, p < .001, partial η2 = .34. 
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Other multivariate effects were not significant, p > .21. Univariate effects are described 
below. 
Team attractiveness. A univariate main effect of morality on team attractiveness 
emerged, F(1, 72) = 29.22, p < .001, partial η2 = .29. As predicted, team attractiveness was 
perceived to be higher in the high team morality condition (M = 4.71, SD = 0.94) than in the 
low morality condition (M = 3.44, SD = 0.99).  
Identification. The analysis of identification revealed a univariate main effect of 
morality, F(1, 72) = 31.79, p < .001, partial η2 = .31. As anticipated, participants in the high 
team morality condition identified more with the team (M = 4.22, SD = 1.24) than did 
participants in the low morality condition (M = 2.71, SD = 0.95).  
Team commitment. The analysis of team commitment yielded a univariate main effect 
of morality, F(1, 72) = 13.45, p < .001, partial η2 = .16. In line with predictions, team 
commitment was higher in the high team morality condition (M = 3.43, SD = 1.03) than in the 
low team morality condition (M = 2.55, SD = 0.97).  
Task decisions. Overall, no significant main or interaction effects of team morality 
and team competence were obtained for the personal decision preferences expressed on task 
items, F < 1.89, p > .17. This suggests that anticipated team climate did not impact personal 
decision-making. Further examination of personal choices made on individual items revealed 
an overall preference for moral decisions over competence decisions: In five out of ten 
decisions participants indicated a preference for the moral option, χ2 > 17.05, p < .001; in one 
decision there was a significant preference for the competent option, χ2 = 30.32, p < .001, and 
in four out of ten decisions participants did not indicate a reliable preference for either the 
moral or the competent option, χ2 < .84, p > .36.   
Cardiovascular measures 
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Analytic strategy. HR, PEP, CO, and TPR were calculated by subtracting mean 
cardiovascular response levels during the last minute of the baseline period from mean 
cardiovascular response levels during each task.3 Outliers (i.e., raw scores more than 3 SDs 
from the mean) were transformed to the most extreme score observed within 3 SDs above or 
below the mean.4 One-sample t-tests were conducted to assess whether HR and PEP changed 
significantly from the baseline period in order to confirm that each task represented a 
motivated performance situation. Finally, repeated-measures ANOVA’s were conducted to 
examine the effects of morality and competence on threat and challenge indicators during all 
three webcam recordings.5 Team morality and team competence were included as between-
subjects factors, whereas the three webcam recordings (in which the participants allegedly 
engaged in a team interaction) were included as a within-subjects factor.  
Task engagement. During the speech about the value participants attached to morality, 
HR increased significantly from baseline levels (M = 18.51, SD = 14.75), t(59) = 9.72, p < 
.001, while PEP dropped significantly (M = -20.73, SD = 16.77), t(59) = -9.58, p < .001. 
Similarly, when explaining to their team members the value they attached to competence 
there was an increase in HR (M = 11.43, SD = 12.91), t(59) = 6.86, p < .001, and a decrease in 
PEP (M = -16.20, SD = 14.74), t(59) = -8.51, p < .001. Finally, when explaining their personal 
decision preferences, there was a significant increase in HR (M = 14.51, SD = 13.33), t(59) = 
8.43, p < .001, and a significant decrease in PEP (M = -14.00, SD = 13.63), t(59) = -7.96, p < 
.001. These findings confirm that participants showed sufficient motivational engagement 
during each of these phases of the alleged team interaction, which in turn paves the way for 
interpreting CO and TPR during these tasks in terms of challenge and threat motivational 
states. 
Challenge and threat. No significant differences were found between the 
cardiovascular responses during the three webcam recordings in CO, F < .47, p > .50, TPR, F 
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< 1.40, p > .24, and TCI, F < .66, p > .42, indicating that cardiovascular responses were 
similar across different phases of the alleged team interaction, that is, when describing to 
other team members behavioral examples indicating the importance attached to morality, the 
importance attached to competence, and when explaining one’s preferred strategy for the 
decision-making task. Across all three phases of the alleged team interaction, the analyses 
yielded significant interactions between morality and competence on CO, F(1, 56) = 17.66, p 
< .001, partial η2 = .24, TPR, F(1, 49) = 8.07, p = .007, partial η2 = .14, and TCI, F(1, 49) = 
13.03, p = .001, partial η2 = .21 (see Figure 1). No main effects of morality, F < 2.13, p > .15, 
or competence, F < 0.74, p > .39, were found.6 
Planned contrasts showed that the ‘incongruent’ conditions - where high value was 
attached to morality and low value to competence or vice versa - did not differ from each 
other in CO, F = 0.01, p = .92, TPR, F = 0.69, p = .41, and TCI, F = 0.10, p = .75, indicating 
that any misalignment in morality and competence in teams elicited similar motivational 
responses. We then compared the two incongruent conditions with the condition where high 
value was attached to both morality and competence. As hypothesized, participants 
experienced greater threat when their team attached little value to morality or to competence 
than when both morality and competence were highly valued by their team, which was 
indicated by lower CO, F(1, 56) = 12.80, p < .001, partial η2 = .19, higher TPR, F(1, 49) = 
8.58, p = .005, partial η2 = .15, and lower TCI, F(1, 49) = 13.15, p < .001, partial η2 = .21.  
When other team members attached equally low value to competence as well as 
morality, we also observed relatively more evidence of challenge than in the incongruent 
conditions, which was marked by higher CO, F(1, 56) = 9.14, p = .004, partial η2 = .14, and 
higher TCI, F(1, 49) = 4.20, p = .05, partial η2 = .08, although no difference was observed in 
TPR, F(1, 49) = 2.35, p = .13. The congruent conditions (when equally high or equally low 
value was attached to competence and morality by other team members) did not differ from 
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each other with respect to CO, F = 0.29, p = .59, TPR, F = 1.45, p = .23, or TCI, F = 1.87, p = 
.18. Thus, threat appeared to be induced when there was an imbalance between competence 
and morality as important concerns, while more challenge emerged when other team members 
did not prioritize morality over competence or vice versa.  
Discussion 
The current research focused on how the value attached to morality and competence in 
task teams can affect self-reported team attractiveness and cardiovascular motivational states 
during team interactions. We examined this in a context where joint decisions needed to be 
made on competing strategies. We replicated prior findings by showing that team morality 
dominated different indicators of people’s attraction to the team. Team attractiveness, 
identification with the team, and team commitment were all primarily affected by team 
morality rather than by team competence. Most importantly, we established that teams where 
equally high value was attached to morality as well as competence elicited a cardiovascular 
challenge response, while cardiovascular threat responses were observed when others 
prioritized either morality or competence concerns. This supports our reasoning that the match 
between task demands and the value attached to morality and competence by team members 
is an important determinant of cardiovascular motivational states, such that a weaker match is 
likely to evoke individual threat responses. In ambiguous team decision-making contexts—
where both morality and competence concerns are vital—individuals experience team 
decision-making as more demanding when there is an imbalance in the value that other team 
members attach to different types of concerns that are both relevant for task performance.  
Interestingly, we observed a similar challenge response when team-level concerns 
were balanced because other team members attached equally low value to morality and 
competence. This situation evoked greater challenge responses than teams where different 
types of concerns were unbalanced. This is in line with our analysis in terms of balance vs. 
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imbalance between different types of concerns in the team as adding to perceived task 
resources vs. demands implied in the situation. Thus, this suggests that threat responses in 
joint decision-tasks indeed relate to the realization of having to compensate for the lack of 
balance in the importance other team members attach to the different concerns relevant to the 
task. Apparently, even when other team members do not particularly care about either type of 
concern, this makes it seem easier for the individual to consider both in making task 
decisions, while more individual effort and outcome uncertainty is implied when other team 
members clearly prioritize one concern over the other. Indeed, when neither competence nor 
morality is particularly valued by other team members, this can be seen to indicate that they 
have no a priori preferences for one or the other. Thus, they may be relatively open to 
arguments in favor of different preferences in each dilemma situation, indicating flexibility in 
relevant concerns as a situational resource relevant to individual task execution. By contrast, a 
misalignment between the value attached to competence vs. morality in the team suggests that 
the team is unwilling to equally consider both aspects when making a joint decision, which 
consequently adds to the demands individuals have to meet to successfully complete the task 
of balancing competence with morality concerns.  
The current findings can inform different situations in social and work life. For 
example, the current findings can be considered as relevant for actual business settings, in 
which teams have to decide about competing business strategies. Although firms are most 
likely to be successful when they adopt a management strategy in which ethical business 
conduct and performance goals converge (Carroll & Shabana, 2010), ethical considerations 
cannot always be reconciled with the pursuit of business success. Other factors—such as 
profit orientation, the financial capacities of an organization, or legal concerns—tend to limit 
the opportunity to always engage in moral initiatives (Barraquier, 2011). Managers are 
therefore frequently confronted with a complex trade-off between financial and nonfinancial 
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business objectives that represent competing demands, in which valid arguments are available 
that justify both objectives (Clegg et al., 2007; Hahn et al., 2010; Margolis & Walsh, 2003; 
Vogel, 2005). Trade-offs between moral values and the need to preserve group performance 
can also be observed in other contexts. For example, previous research has demonstrated that 
supporters of political parties were willing to tolerate and support potential leaders who 
deviated from their in-group norm if these candidates were believed to increase the likelihood 
of electoral success (Morton, Postmes, & Jetten, 2007). These findings underline the more 
general relevance of strategic concerns in group decision-making when task performance 
could suffer from an exclusive focus on normative considerations alone.  
Limitations and future directions 
A limitation of the current research is that the sample size (in particular the number of 
participants whose the cardiovascular responses were suitable for analyses) was relatively 
small. Although the effects of morality and competence on cardiovascular responses were 
assessed across multiple measurement moments as a within-subjects factor—which in turn 
increases statistical power and reduces error variance (Greenwald, 1976)—the robustness of 
the cardiovascular findings would nevertheless require replication in future studies with a 
larger sample.  
An additional limitation of the current research is that the laboratory setting required 
us to employ a decision-making procedure that primarily addressed the initial stages of team 
collaboration, in which team members did not have the opportunity to interact with other team 
members and could only form an impression about the team through the self-descriptions 
provided by their team members. In principle, the impact of such statements about the value 
attached to morality and competence might diminish during later stages of team collaboration 
due to, for example, actual behavior displayed or the development of specific group norms. 
Nevertheless, we argue that our focus on a priori impressions is merited: Initial impressions 
TEAM MORALITY AND COMPETENCE                                                                            22 
have been shown to influence a range of affective and behavioral responses (Brambilla, 
Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011; Brambilla et al, 2013; Ellemers et al., 2013), which in 
turn can influence the decision-making process.    
It can be argued that the stakes of negotiating about competing strategies in decision-
making procedures are higher in real life situations than in experimental task teams. For 
example, research has indicated that experiencing financial insecurity can alter people’s moral 
integrity, such that they are more willing to cheat for financial gain and are more tolerant 
toward immoral behavior for financial gain of others (Sharma, Mazar, Alter, & Ariely, 2014). 
In the current research there were no salient negative outcomes attached to primarily pursuing 
normative objectives during the decision-making process, which might have influenced the 
attractiveness of teams that value morality over competence. Future research could therefore 
explore whether the attractiveness of moral teams is attenuated in contexts that are less 
balanced, because strategic decisions lead to more benefits for the team than normative 
decisions.  
With this research we have established that—when both types of concerns are 
required—an imbalance in the importance attached to competence and morality in a task team 
is more likely to elicit threat than balanced preferences. Future research might further 
examine how this relates to team members’ perceptions of their ability to convince others of 
their self-preferred views, or the confidence they have that different aspects relevant to the 
task will be duly considered. In addition, while the current research focused on the 
anticipation of collaborating with others who prioritize competence over morality or vice 
versa in contexts where both features are important, future research might address how these 
collaborations actually unfold. For instance, it could be examined how people might adapt 
their post-hoc rationalizations of group decisions to the stated concerns of other group 
members. When competence concerns dominate moral concerns in decision-making, people 
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can rationalize their pragmatic and utilitarian approach to the decision-making by invoking 
moral justifications for their behavior after the fact. This is thought to help them maintain 
their moral self-view, and reconcile the conviction that morality is important to them with 
outward displays of behavior that do not seem to attest to this (see also Detert, Treviño, & 
Sweitzer, 2008, and Tetlock, 2003). Future research might address how people use such post 
hoc motivated moral reasoning to resolve a trade-off between normative and strategic 
concerns in ambiguous decision-making contexts, and whether the awareness that they may 
do so could influence their response to an imbalance between morality and competence levels 
of their team members.  
Conclusion 
The added value of the present research beyond prior work on morality and 
competence in decision-making teams is that we established a discrepancy between self-
reported ratings of team attractiveness (in which perceptions of the team’s morality were 
decisive) and physiological responses during task engagement (revealing the importance of 
meeting situational demands by balancing both types of concerns in decision dilemmas). We 
think our observation that when both types of concerns are required, congruent levels of team 
morality and team competence promoted a more adaptive motivational state than incongruent 
team features is particularly noteworthy. Thus, our results show that high team morality can 
elicit a physiological threat response during task performance when the team attaches less 
value to competence as a relevant task requirement. Nevertheless, our findings also indicate 
that morality still functions as the primary determinant of people’s feelings of attraction and 
commitment to the team. As a result—when there is an imbalance between task relevant 
concerns in the team—people may still be willing to engage with other team members in 
addressing the increased situational demands imposed by this imbalance when they are 
attracted and committed to the team because of the high value attached to morality. By 
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contrast, they are less likely to remain committed to a team that represents a source of threat 
when it values competence over morality.  
In sum, the current research offers new insights into the effects of different team 
climates on task engagement. Even though people only seem to pay attention to the morality 
of teams when they anticipate how inclusion in the team could influence their self-views, the 
interplay between competence and morality determines people’s motivational states when 
actually working with others to resolve complex decision-making dilemmas.   
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Footnotes 
1 Additional self-report measures were assessed that are not reported in this 
manuscript. A Principal Component Analysis (PCA) revealed that the additional measures 
were not distinct from the team attractiveness, identification, and team commitment measures. 
We therefore decided to exclude these measures from the analyses.  
2 A PCA was conducted to examine the distinctiveness of the self-report measures. 
Initial results showed that team attractiveness and identification items clustered together, but 
were distinct from the team commitment items. An additional PCA—in which we extracted 2 
factors to tease apart the team attractiveness from the identification items—revealed that these 
measures formed two separate clusters, as intended. Team attractiveness and identification are 
sometimes considered together as evaluative (liking) vs. cognitive (inclusion) aspects of the 
relation between the self and the group. This might account for the high correlation between 
these measures. However, team attractiveness is focused on how individuals judge others in a 
team, whereas identification is focused on whether team features are considered as a relevant 
part of the self. Thus, despite the high correlation between the team attractiveness and 
identification measures, we decided to treat these as two distinct constructs for statistical and 
conceptual reasons.   
3 No differences between conditions in baseline measures emerged, F < 1.25, p > .30.  
4 Across the 16 cardiovascular measures (HR, PEP, CO, and TPR during the four 
measuring moments: baseline period and the three webcam recordings) data were transformed 
in eight cases. 
5 Sixteen participants were excluded from the cardiovascular analyses because of poor 
signal quality during the ICG and ECG recordings, and 5 additional participants were 
excluded because of blood pressure equipment malfunctioning. Consequently, cardiac 
performance measures (i.e., HR, PEP, and CO) were analyzed for 60 participants, and the 
TEAM MORALITY AND COMPETENCE                                                                            31 
blood pressure measure (i.e., TPR) was analyzed for 55 participants, explaining differences in 
degrees of freedom reported. 
6 Additional repeated-measures ANOVA’s were conducted in which the participants’ 
morality and competence scores were included as covariates. The interaction effects between 
morality and competence on CO, TPR, and TCI remained significant, which indicates that 
cardiovascular responses appear to be driven by a preference for balance in team features 
rather than by individual differences in preferences for these concerns.  
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Table 
Table 1. Means, standard deviations, and correlations of the self-report measures  
 M SD 1. 2. 
1. Team attractiveness 4.07 1.15   
2. Identification 3.46 1.33 .78***  
3. Team commitment 2.99 1.09 .65*** .61*** 
 





















TEAM MORALITY AND COMPETENCE                                                                            33 
Figures 
 
Figure 1a. Means and standard errors (in parentheses) of cardiac output across three 
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Figure 1b. Means and standard errors (in parentheses) of total peripheral resistance across 
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Figure 1c. Means and standard errors (in parentheses) of threat and challenge index across 
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